Adani Green Energy is an operating-leverage story built on a 20.8 GW renewable fleet and a rapidly scaling battery business. It sells most output under long-term contracts, with AESL taking C&I and battery offtake, and operates the Khavda park where 10.8 GW is commissioned. The reported economics are strong: H1 FY27 energy sales rose 32% to 25.7 billion units, revenue from power supply rose 36% to ₹8,299 crore, EBITDA rose 41% to ₹7,957 crore and margin was 93%; Q2 revenue rose 45% to ₹4,000.19 crore and EBITDA 51% to ₹3,835 crore. Total H1 EBITDA was ₹8,276 crore, and management said it would have been close to ₹9,000 crore without curtailment. Those are reported results, not annualised guidance.
The business economics are protected by long contracts and a low marginal cost of renewable generation. Management states a 13-14% ROA threshold on capacity tied to AA+ counterparties, with 25-year solar and wind contracts and 15-year battery contracts. About 72% of project loans are fixed for 3-5 years, and overall interest cost is 8.9%, down from 11.1% in 2019. AG23L, about 15% of EBITDA, became AAA at an 8.5% rate, giving a 20-25 basis point benefit. The 13-14% ROA is a management target, not a reported outcome; it translates to a higher ROE because the model runs on roughly 75:25 leverage. The analyst inference is that the equity return is sensitive less to the nominal tariff than to commissioning delays and uncontracted capacity.
The near-term earnings path has three operating variables. First, FY27 renewable commissioning: the original target is 4.5-5 GW, but management now says Phase 3 evacuation is expected in Q4 FY27 and the second 7 GW line is further delayed. Balance-of-system is ready, so the constraint is the external corridor. Second, BESS: installed capacity reached 6.6 GWh after 3 GWh was added in Q2 FY27, more than half of India's operational base, and management expects to exceed 10 GWh in FY27. Third, contracting: only 3.5 GWh of the 6.6 GWh is tied to AESL, with 3.1 GWh in process. AESL pays for scheduled power if a procurer or the grid backs down, but unscheduled generation is not paid. That distinction matters for the merchant-to-C&I de-risking thesis.
Q2 FY27 did not update the FY27 run-rate EBITDA target. The reported H1 total EBITDA of ₹8,276 crore leaves the earlier commitment open. The reported margin and volume growth show operating leverage, but the conversion to full-year run-rate EBITDA depends on commissioning and curtailment. Management's FY30 programme is ₹2.4 lakh crore of capex through FY30, and it describes 45 GW renewable, 5 GW pumped storage and 40-50 GWh of batteries by FY29-30. Leverage is 5.6x; management expects 4.5-5x until nearer FY28-29 and then a move toward 4x or below as capex completes. That is guidance, not a reported deleveraging.
Capital allocation is the second leg of the thesis. Khavda has 10.8 GW commissioned, and the site supports co-located batteries that use otherwise curtailed power. Chitravathi, the maiden 500 MW pumped storage project, is progressing toward completion by year-end but remains uncontracted. The AESL contracts are 25 years for solar and wind and 15 years for batteries, with Q2 citing AESL solar at ₹2.70 per unit and wind at ₹3.93 per unit, against merchant solar at ₹2.4 versus about ₹2.1 last year. These contracts reduce merchant volatility, but they also cap upside and concentrate counterparty exposure in a related listed entity. The 13-14% ROA threshold is the test of whether the transfer price is adequate.
Management delivery is mixed. Q2 FY27 confirms the BESS step to 6.6 GWh and says the company expects to surpass 10 GWh in FY27. But the Khavda evacuation promise has moved to Q4 FY27, the second 7 GW line is further delayed, and 3.1 GWh of BESS contracting is still open. Chitravathi has moved to completion by year-end, with no offtake disclosed. The evidence available here does not establish a longer delivery record, so the FY27 4.5-5 GW target should be treated as conditional rather than assured.
The falsifiers are specific. A Phase 3 slip beyond Q4 FY27 would leave the 4.5-5 GW renewable target and the infirm-to-PPA conversion exposed. A failure to exceed 10 GWh of BESS, or a failure to contract the remaining 3.1 GWh on acceptable AESL terms, would weaken the storage thesis. Chitravathi not completing by year-end, or completing without a contract, would add uncontracted peak-risk capacity. Leverage failing to move toward 4.5-5x by FY28-29 would show that capex is outrunning EBITDA. Conversely, delivery of Phase 3, 10+ GWh of BESS and the AESL contracts at the stated 13-14% ROA would validate the operating-leverage case without requiring a higher tariff. No price target or valuation judgment is implied.
companyname: Adani Green Energy Limited ticker: ADANIGREEN sector: Renewable Energy / Power Generation Adani Green Energy Limited develops, owns and operates utility-scale solar, wind, solar-wind hybrid, battery energy storage and pumped storage projects in India. It sells power under 25-year fixed-tariff PPAs to DISCOMs, contracts C&I and battery capacity to Adani Energy Solutions, and operates the Khavda renewable park. H1 FY27 energy sales rose 32% YoY to 25.7 billion units. Revenue from po...
Read the full report →capex
Management targets 4.5-5 GW of renewable commissioning in FY27, expects to exceed 10 GWh of battery storage in FY27, expects Phase 3 Khavda evacuation in Q4 FY27, targets 13-14% ROA with AA+ counterparties, reiterates ₹2.4 lakh crore capex through FY30, and guides leverage to 4.5-5x until nearer FY28-29 before moving lower.
mixed
Get valuation models, detailed research reports, thematic primers, risk analysis, growth triggers, bear case, capex tracker, walk the talk, and more for Adani Green Energy Limited and 4,900+ companies.
5-day free pass. No card required.